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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive psychologists have recently been concerned
not only with how people comprehend and memorize
information, but also with the ability people have to know
how much information they have stored in their memory, and
what information they may be able to retrieve.

The term

metacognition refers to a person's knowledge about anything
related to cognitive processes {Brown, 1978}.
Metacognitive skills, for instance, enable people to
discriminate between information they "know they know" and
information that they do not know or are less sure of.
The metacognitive skills of children and college
students have been studied under many conditions, but until
recently, few studies have concentrated on the
metacognitive abilities of older adults.

Much of the

emphasis of research on metacognitive ability has therefore
been concerned with how student's knowledge about what they
do and do not know affects their efforts in learning
material and their performance on tests, and how student
metacognitive abilities may be improved.

These may be the

easiest and most direct applications of "knowing about
knowing" skills.

Yet as people grow older, they are

exposed to more and more information.

Therefore, it

becomes increasingly important for them to be able to
1
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discriminate between the information they know and the
information they do not know, so that they can make
accurate decisions in all aspects of their lives.
The focus of the present study is to examine one
metacognitive skill, that of confidence judgments, in older
adults. This study will examine whether there are any
differences between young and older adults in this
metacognitive skill, and whether there are differences
between young and older adults in their reactions to
feedback about their performance of this skill.

The study

will also examine the effects of "monetary incentive" on
the confidence judgments of young and older adults.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Metacognitive research, in its broadest sense,
includes any research concerned with "knowing about
knowing ...

However, a large amount of the available

research on metacognition centers around subject
performance on three specific metacognitive tasks:
judgment-of-knowing tasks, feeling-of-knowing tasks, and
confidence ratings of responses to general information
questions.

Most research on these tasks has used young

adults and children as subjects.

However, recent interest

in the psychology of aging has led several researchers to
include older adult subjects in these metacognitive
studies.
The following review is organized from a developmental
perspective of subject performance, from childhood to old
age, in each of these three metacognitive tasks.

Although

all three tasks are concerned with aspects of metacognitive
ability, the research studies employing these tasks differ
in the methodology that they use.

Therefore, a brief

review of the methodology of each task will be presented
first.

This will be followed by a review of the research

studies that use these tasks to study metacognitive
abilities for three age groups: children, young adults, and
older adults.

3
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Review of Research Methodology:

Judgment-of-Knowing

Predictions
Judgment-of-knowing prediction tasks test
metacognitive abilities by asking subjects to make
judgments about the likelihood that they will be able to
remember information they are presently studying
(e.g.Gardiner & Klee, 1976).

For example, subjects may be

given a list of words to study, and asked during study to
predict how likely they think it is that they will recall
each word.

Later they are given a recall test on the list,

and their actual performance compared to their predicted
performance.
Feeling-of-Knowing Predictions
If everyone had a perfect memory, then people would be
able to retrieve any information that they had stored in
their memory, and the

only information that they would not

be able to retrieve would be information that they had
never encoded.

In reality, people often fail to recall

information that they actually do have stored in their
memory.

They may

11

feel that they know" the information,

that it is on the "tip-of-their-tongue", and yet be
temporarily unable to recall it.

This Tip-of-the-Tongue

(TOT) phenomenon, first mentioned by William James (1893),
is a "feeling-of-knowing" occurrence, and
explored by several researchers.

has been

Naturally occurring TOT

states were first studied by Woodworth (1934) for English
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words, and Wencl (1934) for German words.

They found that

when complete recall of a word is not present, people can
often recall part of the word, such as a letter or syllable
from the word, or something abstract about the word, such
as how many syllables it has.

Brown and McNeill (1966)

also noted that subjects in a TOT state had knowledge of
certain letters in the word, and also knew where the
primary stress in the word was found.

Yarmey (1973)

explored verbal and non-verbal imagery codes involved in
the TOT phenomenon by presenting subjects with pictures of
famous people and asking them to try to recall their names.
His TOT state subjects also used knowledge about the
letters and syllables in the famous person's name for
retrieval, and in addition to this information they relied
on information about the target person's profession, or the
last time that they had seen the target.
The TOT phenomenon is related to the "feeling-ofknowing" paradigm introduced by Hart (1965, 1967).

Hart's

hypothesis was that people may be more likely to recognize
information that they feel that they know but can't recall,
than information for which they have no "feeling-ofknowing".

The method that Hart used to study "feeling-of-

knowing" skills was to first ask subjects to recall general
information items, and then, for those items not recalled,
to judge whether an answer would be recognized if it was
presented among several alternatives.

After these feeling-

6
of-knowing predictions, subjects were given a multiplechoice test in order to evaluate their actual recognition
of these items.
Confidence Judgements
A third task used to assess metacognitive abilities is
to ask subjects to make a judgment about how confident they
are that an answer they have given to a question is
correct.

These confidence judgments are usually made by

asking subjects to estimate the probability that each of
their answers is correct.

A "calibration" measure of how

accurately subjects have made their confidence judgments
(how well "calibrated" they are) is achieved by having
subjects answer a series of questions, and give a
confidence rating (in the form of a probability) for each.
This rating reflects how confident they are that their
answer is correct.

A comparison is then made between the

number of items receiving any given rating, and the actual
proportion correct for items at that rating.

For example,

if subjects gave a series of their answers a .80 confidence
rating, stating that they are 80% sure that these answers
are correct, then to be well-calibrated, they should
actually get an average of 80% of these answers corre.ct.
An examination of research employing these tasks, with
subjects from different age groups, follows.

Many of these

studies indicate "developmental trends" in these
metacognitive tasks, with older children and young adults

displaying better metacognitive skills than younger

7

children.
Developmental Studies In Metacognition
Flavell (1971) has termed knowledge that people have
about their own memory "metamemory". This term has often
been used interchangeably with "metacognition'', especially

in developmentally based studies.

Wellman (1977) has

pointed out that a distinction can be made betweeen two
types of metamemory: (1)

Timeless facts that people could

know about memory (i.e. short lists are easier to learn
than long lists; young children are usually worse at
memorizing lists than adults, etc.);

(2)

Ongoing

assessments people could make about information in their
own memory (i.e.

this information is in my memory: this

information is definitely not there, etc.).

The

developmental studies that follow are concerned with this
second type of metacognition, exploring assessments that
subjects can make about information in their own memories.
Childhood
Several studies using metacognitive tasks have
compared the performance of young, school age children to
that of older children or college students.

Some of these

studies have shown that even very young children can
accurately discriminate between items they have missed and
items they have identified correctly on previous testing.

8

For instance, Masur, Mcintyre and Flavell (1973) tested the
ability of first graders to judge which items they had
recalled correctly and which items they had missed on a
recall test.

The children showed high identification

accuracy: 98% of their identifications were correct for
recalled items and 96% were correct for nonrecalled items.
Berch and Evans (1973) presented kindergarten and
third grade subjects with a list of items.

After the items

were presented once, the children were given a second list
of items, and asked to judge whether any of the items had
been viewed on the first list.

The children were also

asked to make judgments about how sure they were that their
identifications were correct.

Their results showed that

the probability of recognizing an item, for both age groups
of children, varied directly as a function of their
certainty judgments.

This indicates that children of both

ages were capable of monitoring the certainty of their
recognition.
Other studies indicate that although children do show
metamemory skills very early, there are some developmental
trends in metacognitive accuracy.

Flavell, Friedrichs and

Hoyt (1970) instructed children to study a set of stimuli
until they could recall all the items.

It was emphasized

that the children were not to signal for a recall test
until they were sure that they could achieve perfect

9
recall.

Second and fourth graders were relatively accurate

on this task of item recallability, but nursery school and
kindergarten students frequently called for the recall test
before they were able to correctly recall all the items.
Kreutzer, Leonard and Flavell (1975) asked children in
grades K,l,3, and 5 to make ease of learning judgments for
lists of paired words that were

11

0pposites 11 versus lists of

paired words of people and things they may do.

The

opposites list was shown to be easier to learn by all the
children.

However, older children were more likely than

younger children to be able to identify that they would
have an easier time learning the lists of opposites than
the list of people-things they do. Even when younger
children chose the opposites list as easier to learn, they
were often not able to explain why it was easier. The young
children did, however, show some knowledge of the
relationship between being familiar with a list of items
and the ease with which the items could be learned.
Young children appear to have some trouble not only in
discriminating how easy lists of items will be to learn,
but also, for prose passages, in discriminating which items
will be important to learn in order to remember the main
ideas of the prose passage, and which items would be less
important to spend time studying (Brown & Smiley ,1977).
Similiar differences in these types of discrimination
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abilities have been found in comparing academically
successful elementary students, who can make these
discriminations accurately, with less successful students,
who have trouble making these discriminations (Smiley,
Oakly, Worthen, Campione,

& Brown, 1977: OWings, Petersen,

Bransford, Morris, & Stein, 1980).
Wellman (1977) designed a study using Hart's(l965)
feeling-of-knowing paradigm.

He asked kindergarten, first

and third grade children to recall the name of items
depicted in pictures. When the children failed to recall
any name, they were asked to give a feeling-of-knowing
judgment about their ability to recognize the name if it
was presented to them.

They were also asked to judge

whether or not they had ever seen the depicted item before.
They were given a recognition test for all those items they
had been unable to recall.

There was a significant

increase with age in the subjects' ability to predict which
items they would and would not be able to recognize.
Kindergartners were only somewhat better than chance in
their predictions, whereas third graders were fairly
accurate in their recognition predictions.

All subjects

were able to predict whether or not they had seen an item
before, but the kindergartners seemed to ignore their
"seen" judgments when making their feeling-of-knowing
predictions.

11

Although even very young children seem to have some
metacognitive abilities, it is clear that these abilities
improve as children grow older.

Wertsch (1979) has

proposed a theory of how metacognitive abilities originate
and develop in preschoolers based on social interaction.
His theory states that the crucial element in metacognitive
development is adult-child interaction in a problemsolving setting (Wertsch, 1979: Wertsch, McNamee, McLane &
Budwig, 1980).

Kontos (1983) tested this hypothesis by

observing the performance of pre-school children during a
problem-solving task.

The preschoolers, ages 3-5, were

asked to solve three peg-puzzles that required putting pegs
in holes.

Each child was given a 5 minute interval to

attempt to solve the puzzle, and after each puzzle session,
children were asked to explain how they had tried to solve
the puzzle (to ascertain any
had used).

11

metacognitive strategy .. they

During the second puzzle solving session, an

adult, either the preschooler's mother or father, was
allowed to be present during the session to help her or his
son or daughter solve the puzzle by giving verbal strategy
clues.
A third puzzle solving session, with the preschoolers
working alone again, followed the second session.

Changes

in the preschoolers' metacognitive abilities were assessed
by comparing their performance and strategy use on puzzle 1

12
to that on puzzle 3.

Kontos found that children who had

not received help from their parents during the puzzle 2
session improved just as much in performance and knowledge
of strategy use as children who received many verbal
directives from their parents.

It was concluded that

practice may be just as important in the development of
metacognitive ability in children as adult-child
interactions.

The study also indicates that children may

be able to increase their metacognitive abilities through
training and practice.
A review of metacognitive studies employing children
as subjects indicates that, although even young children
(i.e., kindergarten age) show some metacognitive abilities,
these abilities seem to improve with age.

This is

especially true for more complicated tasks, such as judging
the amount of study time needed to learn a list of
information, or making feeling-of-knowing judgments about
information that cannot be recalled.
Young Adulthood
Most metacognitive studies have employed young
college-age adults (usually 18-22 years of age) as
subjects.

Since the major emphasis in a college student's

life is on how to study effectively, many metacognitive
studies with young adults have used judgment-of-knowing
tasks.
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For example, Groninger (1979) presented subjects with
a list of 60 words and asked them to rate, as they heard
each word, their confidence that they would later be able
to recall that word.

They were then tested for recall,

and, after the recall test, given a surprise recognition
memory test.

In the recognition task the subjects heard

the target words interspersed with distractor words.

Their

task was to rate how sure they were that each word was a
target word.

Subjects' actual recall and recognition

scores related to

thei~prediction

ratings, although they

considerably overestimated their performance abilities.

A

second part of the study found that accurate recall
predictions were also significantly related to word
frequency and imagery variables.
In addition to predictions of what will be recalled,
judgment-of-knowing tasks include studies examining the
ability of people to discriminate what they have and have
not been able to recall on previous study-test trials.
These studies examine the relationship between knowledge of
previous test-trial performance and a subject's performance
on later study trials.
One of the studies examining this relationship is by
Gardiner and Klee (1976).

They gave college students a

series of free-recall lists, each of which they studied and
attempted to recall on a recall test.

Following the recall

14
test on the last list, the subjects were given the words
from all the lists, and were asked to identify which words
they had recalled on the initial tests.

Even though this

final test was unexpected, subjects were generally accurate
in being able to distinguish previously recalled and nonrecalled items.
A study by King, Zechrneister, and Shaughnessy (1980)
also underlined the importance of previous test trials for
accurate judgment of knowing ratings. They gave subjects
several exposures to pairs-of-items from two lists, and
then asked them to predict for each pair the likelihood
that the response term would be recalled when the stimulus
term was presented on subsequent trials.

Half of the

subjects received only study trials prior to the prediction
task. The other half of the subjects received alternating
study and test trials.

All the subjects were also required

to learn a third paired-associate list and make judgments
of knowing without receiving any test trials.

The results

showed that prediction accuracy was consistently higher for
those subjects who had been given test trials prior to the
prediction task.

Also, those subjects who had been given

test trials on the first two lists showed a decrease in
prediction accuracy on the third list for which they did
not receive test trials.
One theory explaining the increase in judgment of
knowing accuracy with the use of test trials has been

15
suggested by Bisanz, Vesonder, and Voss (1978).

Their

hypothesis states that learners make decisions regarding
memory processing based on their discimination between
known and not yet known items.

Accurate discriminaton

between information a learner already knows, and
information that he or she needs to spend more time
studying, would enable the learner to shift processing from
well-learned items to processing less well-learned items,
thus letting the learner distribute study time efficiently.
Other theories have been suggested to explain
discrimination of known and unknown information in the
absence of test trials.

Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) have

proposed that subjects make these judgments of knowing on
the basis of perceived item difficulty, since they found
ease of learning (EL) ratings to correlate highly with JK
responses made during study.
Zechmeister, Christensen, and Rajkowski (1980)
examined the relationship between EL ratings and JK ratings
by presenting two groups of students with a list of facts.
One group of subjects was asked to rate each sentence in
terms of how easy or hard it would be for someone in
general to remember, while the other group rated items in
terms of how easy or hard each item would be for themselves
to remember.

On every trial a fact was presented followed

by study, a judgment-of-knowing rating, and then, after a
filler task, recall was tested.

Although JK ratings were
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found to be better predictors of item difficulty than EL
ratings, EL ratings did reliably predict item difficulty.
Zechmeister et al. also found evidence to suggest that
there was a difference in the JK performance between good
and poor learners in that good learners were, in one
condition, more accurate in "knowing what they know".
Judgment-of-knowing predictions, then, have been shown
to be quite accurate after only study trials are used.
However, the method used to present items to a subject can
affect JK predictions.

When memory for a lengthy list of

verbal items is tested, items that have been repeated
within the list in a distributed manner {DP) are more
likely to be remembered than are items repeated in a massed
fashion {MP) {Hintzman, 1974).

Subjects spend less time

studying massed presentations of an item than studying
distributed presentations when study is self-paced
{Shaughnessy, Zimmerman & Underwood, 1972).

Zechmeister

and Shaughnesy {1980) found that in a judgment of knowing
task, MP items were consistently judged to be more
recallable than the DP items, even though recall was
actually higher for DP items.

Learners were, however,

accurately able to predict that twice-presented items would
be easier to recall than once-presented items.
A summary of judgment-of-knowing predictions for young
adults indicates that their predictions about what
information they will and will not be able to recognize and

17

recall after study are related to their actual performance.
However, young adult subjects do show some overconfidence
in their judgments, predicting that they will recognize or
recall more items than they are able

to, and erroneously

judging that MP items will be more recallable than DP
items.
The feeling-of-knowing (FK) task has also been used to
study the metacognitive abilities of young adults.

As

stated earlier, Hart was the first researcher to use the
feeling-of-knowing paradigm.

In Hart's first experiments

(1965), subjects were asked to attempt recall of general
information items, and, then, for those items not recalled,
to judge whether an answer would be recognized if it was
presented among several alternatives.

Following these

recall and judgment phases, a multiple-choice recognition
'

test was given. The basic test of the accuracy of the FK
responses (feeling-of-knowing items that recognition is
predicted for) and FK responses (those the subject predicts
they probably will not recall)

is made by looking only at

the test items that subjects predicted they had missed, and
in actuality had missed, on the test of recall.

If the

feeling-of-knowing judgments are accurate indicators of
memory storage, the proportion correct recognition for FK
items should be significantly greater than the proportion
correct for FK items.

Hart's results showed that FK

predictions are accurate indicators of memory storage.
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Memory performance on FK items was correct 67% of the time,
whereas performance on FK items proved correct only about
40% of the time, although this also shows that subjects
were overconfident in their feeling-of-knowing judgments.
Hart emphasizes that overcautious withholding of
correct answers can falsely inflate a subject's memorymonitoring accuracy by producing correct recognition
responses that should have been eliminated from the scoring
as correct recall responses. Therefore, it is important to
encourage subjects to guess.

Hart has shown memory

monitoring accuracy to occur in college students for
general information questions {1965) as well as for paired
associate materials {1967) and results are the same whether
simple FK or FK dichotomous ratings or 6 pt. rating scales
for feeling-of-knowing judgments are used.
Blake {1973) points out that even though subjects in
Hart's experiments {1965,1967) recognized more items given
FK ratings than FK ratings, subjects showed overconfidence
in some of their judgments by failing to recognize about
44% of the items they felt they knew.

They also recognized

42% of the items they felt they did not know.

He suggested

that one of the problems in Hart's procedure is that there
were substantial time lapses between attempted recall of a
given item, FK judgments, and recognition of items.

This

could possibly reduce the predictive power of the FK
judgments.

Blake used trigram stimuli presented so that
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all three phases, test, recall, and recognition, could be
obtained on each item before presentation of the next item.
His results indicated that a reduction in the time between
item recall, FK judgments and item recognition can increase
FK rating accuracy.
Freedman and Landauer (1966) investigated both the TOT
and FK phenomena, replicating the results of previous
findings.

Their subjects were also able to accurately

predict which items missed on the recall test would be
accurately identified on the recognition test.

They also

found, similar to the tip-of-the-tongue studies, that
providing subjects with the initial letter of the correct
answer on the recognition test significantly increased
recognition of the answer.
The FK and related metacognitive tasks, then, indicate
that young adults are fairly accurate at knowing whether or
not they will be able to recognize information that they
cannot, in some given time period, recall, but that there
is a tendency for people to be overconfident in their
judgments.
Metacognitive studies of college-aged students have
also included research on the confidence judgments (CJ)
that young adults ascribe to the accuracy of their answers
to general information questions.

Murdock (1966) assessed

subject confidence judgments by presenting subjects with
lists, each composed of five paired associate words.

After
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the presentation of each list, a probe was given for one of
the pairs, and subjects were asked to recall the word
associated with the probe and give a rating of how
confident they were that their answer was correct.

They

used a 6-point scale ranging from a point indicating that
they were positive that their response was correct to a
point indicating that they were positive that their
response was incorrect.

Murdock found that subjects could

assess their performance quite accurately.

When they gave

the highest rating they were nearly always correct, and
when they gave the lowest judgment they were nearly always
wrong.
A group of researchers at a Decision Research Center
in Oregon has focused many of their research studies on
examining how subjects are calibrated.

The basic design of

their research is to give subjects general information
questions, and have them respond to each question by
choosing the most likely answer from two alternatives
provided.

They are then asked to indicate their degree of

certainty that the answer they have selected is correct.
These studies have found that college students tend to be
overconfident in their confidence ratings to general
information questions (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977;
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980) as well as in their
responses to more practical information questions, such as
which diseases or accidents are more likely to be fatal
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(Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977).
Some confidence judgment studies have reported that
people who know more are better calibrated.

Nickerson and

McGoldrick (1963,1965) and Pitz (1974) have reported that
people who know more about the materials they are being
tested on are more accurate in their confidence ratings,
and Maki and Berry (1984) found that high achieving
students were better able to accurately predict their
future test performance than were lower achieving students.
Shaughnessy (1979) has reported a positive relationship
between confidence judgment accuracy and test performance.
Lichtenstein et al. (1977) in an in-depth study,
examined the relationship between knowledge and accurate
calibration.

Using general information, two-alternative

choice questions, they found that, if percent of items
answered correctly is held constant between subjects, there
is no evidence that expertise in a particular area leads to
better calibration.

When subjects were not matched for

percent of items answered correctly, subjects who knew more
clearly outperformed those who knew nothing.

The latter

situation tended to lead to high levels of overconfidence,
poor calibration and little accurate discrimination
between use of numbers on the probability scale.

With

increasing knowledge carne decreasing overconfidence until,
for those whose percentage correct exceeded 80%, there was
moderate underconfidence.

This study indicates the

22
importance of matching subjects for percent of items
correct, before assessing their confidence ratings.
It has already been cited that the major finding from
the Decision Research Center is that college-aged subjects
are overconfident in evaluating the accuracy of their
knowledge.

Fischhoff et al. (1977) found that subjects

were so confident in the confidence judgments they had made
that many were willing to stake money on the accuracy of
their judgments.

The overconfidence of all of these

subjects willing to gamble was so great that all would have
actually lost money if the gamble had been real.
Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980)
hypothesized that overconfidence is due to relying more on
reasons consistent with a chosen answer than on
considerations contradicting it.

To test this hypothesis,

they first had each of their subjects choose the correct
alternative for a series of general information questions,
and then had them judge the probability that their choice
was correct.

They used two conditions for this task: one

where subjects were not required to give reasons for their
choices, and another where subjects were required to
specify all possible reasons that they could give for
favoring and opposing each choice.

They found that the

calibration scores for the subjects under the reasons
condition were superior to those under the control
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condition.

In a second experiment they found that a group

listing only contradictory reasons also improved
significantly in calibration.

These results strongly

suggest that confidence in an answer depends on the reasons
a subject can provide to support or contradict the answer.
Several recent studies have addressed the possibility
of training realistic confidence.

Lichtenstein and

Fischhoff (1980) have reported that people can improve
their confidence accuracy if comprehensive feedback on
their performance is provided.

They gave subjects feedback

on the accuracy of their confidence ratings over multiple
training sessions.

They found that feedback did lead to

improved calibration, but that almost all of the
improvement in the quality of subject ratings took place
after the first feedback session.
Zechmeister, Rusch, and Markell (1986) also found that
confidence judgment accuracy improved for subjects who were
provided with feedback, although they found that training
had more of an effect on improving the calibration scores
of subjects defined as low achievers than on those
designated as high achievers.

Arkes, Lai, and Hackett

(1982) have shown that simply informing subjects that they
will have to explain why they have chosen each of their
answers to a group of fellow subjects reduces subject
overconfidence, even in the absence of training sessions or
the requirements to list contradictory reasons.
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In general, confidence judgment studies indicate that
young adults tend to be overconfident in evaluating the
accuracy of their knowledge of general information.
However, subjects are better

11

calibrated" if they are asked

to give support for and, more importantly, against their
answers before they assign a confidence rating to their
response.

Training sessions, giving subjects feedback

about their confidence ratings, have also been shown to
improve the confidence judgment accuracy of young adults.
Older Adults
The metacognitive abilities of older adults have been
ignored until recently.

Research has shown that

metacognitive abilities indicate a developmental trend,
with older children and young adults showing more accurate
metacognitive skills than younger children (Kreutzer,
Leonard, & Flavell, 1975}.

Research on the metacognitive

abilities of older adults explores the idea that the
development of metacognitive abilities may extend
throughout adulthood, and the possibility that older adults
may show metacognitive skills that are different from those
of younger adults.
A study by Lachman, Lachman, and Thronesbury (1979)
assessed this possibility by examining the metamemory
abilities of young, middle-aged, and older adults.
employed feeling-of-knowing tasks dealing both with

They
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questions of accuracy (are items predicted to be known
actually known) and efficiency (do people spend more time
searching for an answer they believe they know than one
they don't know).

The task was similar to Hart's {1965)

study using general information questions.

No age group

showed better metamemorial accuracy or efficiency than any
other.

All of the age groups answered more items correctly

that they thought they knew and fewer items they thought
they did not know, although all groups showed some
overconfidence in their judgments.

All subjects spent more

time responding to items they thought they knew and less
time responding to items they thought they did not know.
It did appear, however, that relative to the other groups,
the oldest group may have suppressed some correct answers
and included them in the most confident feeling-of-knowing
category. This possibility may make the feeling-of-knowing
ratings for the oldest group misleading, since it was
previously mentioned by Hart ·(1965) that cautiousness of
responding can lead to inflated estimates of feeling-ofknowing accuracy.

The oldest group may not have had

feeling-of-knowing ratings that were as accurate as the
other age groups if they had not suppressed some of their
correct answers.
Perlmutter (1978) has assessed the memory monitoring
skills of older and younger subjects' at two education
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levels: high school and doctoral.

She tested subjects'

memory prediction judgments, feeling-of-knowing judgments
and confidence judgments for words and facts.

The word

tasks involved having subjects study 24 words under
incidental and intentional conditions.

They were then

asked to predict how many words they felt they would be
able to recall, and were then given a recall test.

After

the test, they were asked to rate, for the words they had
recalled, how confident they were, on a 4 point scale, that
each word they had recalled was on the originally presented
list.

They were also asked to predict how many of the

words they had not been able to recall they felt they would
be able to recognize.

For the fact portion of the study,

24 general information fact questions were presented and
subjects were instructed to answer the questions, make
confidence ratings for as many of the questions as they
could recall, and for those they could not recall, predict
how many they would be able to recognize.

No age

differences in accuracy of confidence ratings, or
recognition predictions were found, although more education
at any age was associated with more accurate memory
monitoring skills.

Perlmutter suggests that lack of age

differences in metacognitive abilities may indicate that
these abilities do not contribute to age differences in
adult memory.
Murphy, Sanders, Gabriesheski, and Schmitt's {1980)
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two-part study examined judgment of knowing skills of older
adults.

The first part of the study examined two JK tasks.

All subjects were first asked to estimate their memory span
for a series of line drawings, and then each subject was
given a span test to assess their estimation accuracy.
After this task was completed, subjects were instructed to
study each of three different lengths

of line drawing

lists (with the length of each based on variations of their
previous memory span accuracy).

They were told to spend as

much time as they felt was necessary to accurately recall
each of the lists.

The results for the estimation task

showed that young and older adults were equally accurate in
their memory span estimation, although older subjects
memory span performance was considerably less than that of
the younger adults.

The older adults performed more poorly

than the younger adults in the recall readiness task in
that they chose to study less time in response to
increasing task difficulty than did the younger subjects.
In a second part of the study it was shown that differences
in recall readiness accuracy between the age groups could
be eliminated if older subjects were forced to spend at
least a set minimal amount of time studying the lists.
Differences between the metacognitive abilities of
young and older adults may not always reflect "age"
differences.

Like Perlmutter (1978), Zivian and Darjes

(1983) have suggested that since school provides students

•
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with opportunities to practice a variety of mnemonic
strategies, and to evaluate their abilities to memorize, it
may have a positive effect on judgment-of-knowing tasks.
They compared four groups of female subjects on memory
performance for a list of 30 words, and on metacognitive
strategies used to learn the list.

The four groups

consisted of young college students, middle-aged college
students, and middle-aged and older (over 65) women who had
not attended college in the last 5 years.

Subjects in

school performed better on the memory recall test, and
reported using more mnemonic strategies to learn the word
list, than did subjects not in school.

However, there were

no significant differences between the young and middleaged subjects in school, or the middle-aged and older
subjects out of school.

Zivian and Darjes concluded that

being in school may be a better predictor of metacognitive
and memory performance than age differences.
These developmental studies examining metacognitive
skills indicate that, although there are developmental
trends .showing older children to be more accurate in these
skills than younger children, accuracy in metacognitive
judgments for some tasks can be seen in children as early
as kindergarten.

Young adults are fairly accurate in

assessing their metacognitive skills, although they are
often "overconfident" in their assessments.

And of the few

studies examining metacognitive ability in old age, only
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one study (Nurphy et al. 1980) showed older subjects to be
less accurate at making these judgments, with the other two
studies showing no age decrements between young and older
adults.

No calibration curves on the metacognitive

abilities of older adults have yet been obtained.
Age Differences in Cautiousness and Risk-Taking
Studies on age differences in cautiousness and risktaking may help lead to predictions about age differences
in confidence judgment tasks, since

"well-calibrated"

people could be seen as being "more cautious" in their
confidence judgments than a person who is overconfident in
using confidence judgment ratings.
Several studies examining age differences in risktaking responses have used a "choice-dilemma questionnaire"
originally developed by Kogan and Wallach (1961).

The

questionnaire is made up of a series of everyday life
situations.

The central person in each situation is forced

with a choice between two courses of action, one which is
more risky than the other, but also more rewarding if the
outcome is successful.

The subject must indicate the

probability of success that he or she feels would be
sufficient to warrant the risky choice.

They select from

six probability of success alternatives presented after
each situation is given:

1, 3, 5, 7 or 9 chances out of 10

that the risky alternative will be a success, and an
alternative not to choose the risky course no matter what
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the probability of success.

Many studies employing this

task to test age differences in risk-taking have found
older adults to respond cautiously, choosing higher
probabilities of success than younger adults before they
feel it would be desirable for the person described in the
dilemma to take the more risky course of action (Botwinick,
'

1966,1969: Kagan & Wallach, 1961: Vroom & Pahl, 1971).
Botwinick (1969) found that the main reason for this age
difference in responding was the fact that elderly subjects
were more likely to choose the "no-choice of risky
alternative no matter what the probability of success"
option than were younger adults. When this option was
unavailable, Botwinick (1969) found that elderly and
younger subjects were similar in their risk-taking
responses.
More recent studies have examined risk-taking in the
elderly in terms of task performance under different
conditions of reinforcement.

Reinforcement has either been

studied in terms of instructional set, where subjects
receive instructions reinforcing or discouraging risktaking responses (Okun & Di Vesta, 1976), or monetary
incentive, where subjects are reinforced with money for
risk-taking behavior (Birkhill & Schaie, 1975: Okun &
Cherin, 1977: Robins, 1969: and Winefeld & Hullins, 1980).
All of these studies on the relationship of
reinforcement to risk-taking support Botwinick's (1969)
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finding that when a risk-taking option is not available, or
in the case of reinforcement, made somehow undesirable,
older subjects and younger subjects will show similar risktaking responses.

The elderly will, however, tend to

choose to take fewer risks, or not to respond at all, when
given the option.

This often results in increased omission

errors in the elderly, and more cautious responding.
These cautiousness studies indicate that older
subjects are more likely to choose the most extreme and
cautious response, that of taking no risks, than are
younger subjects, when that

response is available.

However, when older subjects are forced to use a scale
without a "no risk" option, they are similar to younger
subjects in their risk-taking responses.

This implies that

the type of scale used to make risk-taking ratings may
affect older subject responses more than it affects the
responses of younger subjects.

RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY

The present experiment will examine the effect of
three variables on confidence ratings.
is age.

The first variable

No confidence rating studies have examined

calibration differences between young and older adults.
Most of the studies looking at age differences in
metacognitive tasks have not found older subjects to be
significantly different from young subjects in their
metacognitive skills.

However, Lachman et al. (1979)

indicated that the older adults in their study may have
been more cautious than the younger subjects in the recall
phase of the experiment, being less likely than the younger
subjects to say that they recalled an answer that they were
not positive about.

This could lead to an "inflated"

feeling-of-knowing performance for older adults, since they
may have been more likely than younger adults to make a
"feeling-of-knowing" rating on items that they could
actually recall.

Older subjects in the Lachman et al.

(1979) study did show feeling-of-knowing ratings that were
similar to those of the younger subjects; however, if their
performance was artificially "inflated" due to cautious
responding, they may actually be less accurate than young
adults in their feeling-of-knowing assessments.

Murphy et

al. (1980) suggested that older subjects may have more

J2

problems than younger subjects in making judgment-ofknowing assessments.
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Thus, older subjects may have more

problems than younger subjects in making confidence
ratings, perhaps showing

11

poorer calibration ...

However, the Lachman et al. (1979} study indicates
that older subjects may show more .. cautiousness" in
responding than younger subjects, and research on
cautiousness indicate that older subjects will respond more
cautiously (Botwinick, 1966), and will show more omission
errors than young subjects, in some
when given the chance.

11

risk-taking 11 tasks,

This might lead to a prediction

that older subjects will be less overconfident than younger
subjects, perhaps showing "better calibration".
In the present study, subjects did not have the choice
of "not responding".

All subjects were required to respond

to a series of general information questions, and to rate
their confidence that their response is correct.

However,

all subjects were able to choose a "cautious" rating that
indicated that they had no idea whether or not their
response was correct.
The second variable to be examined is monetary
incentive.

Past studies have all employed number scales

for subjects to use to make their confidence judgment
ratings.

The present study will provide half of the

subjects with a "money incentive" scale, where they will
"bet money" to make their ratings, and half of the subjects
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will be provided with the usual "number" scale (no money 3
incentive) to make

their ratings.

The prediction is that

subjects may be more accurate in their confidence ratings
if they think they can win money by being accurate, than if
they have no money incentive to be accurate.
The third variable studied is the effect of feedback
on confidence ratings.

Past studies have indicated that

training subjects by providing them with information about
their confidence judgment performances can help them to
improve their confidence judgment accuracy on future tests
(Lichtenstein et al., 1980).

The present study asked

subjects to go through the same set of general information
questions twice, assigning confidence ratings to their
responses both times.

In between trials, subjects were

given brief feedback that they may have been overconfident
on their ratings during the first trial, and encouraged to
try to make accurate ratings on the second trial.

The

hypothesis is that subjects will be less overconfident in
their ratings on Trial 2 than they were on Trial 1, even
though the feedback was be brief, and not directed to any
specific Trial 1 responses.

METHOD
Subjects
A total of 34 college students,

(X age= 19.38 yrs.)

from Loyola University in Chicago and the College of St.
Thomas in St. Paul volunteered to participate in the study.
These students received credit towards their grade in
Introduction to Psychology classes in exchange for their
participation.

A total of 28 older adults,

(X age= 71.61

yrs.),from the Roger's Park area in Chicago were also
recruited, with the majority located through senior citizen
centers.

All older subjects were offered $1 to participate

in the study.
One half of the subjects at each age level were
randomly assigned to the "Questions-only Condition"(No
Money Reinforcement).

All subjects who had been assigned

to this condition were asked to give true/false responses
to each of 100 general information statements, and to rate
each of these responses in terms of their confidence that
it was correct.

The other half of the subjects were

randomly assigned to the "Monetary Incentive
condition"(Money Reinforcement}.

Subjects assigned to this

condition were asked to give true/false responses to each
of 100 general information statements: however they were
asked to predict how certain they were that each response
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was correct by stating the number of pennies they would be
willing to bet that their response was correct, from 0 to 5
cents.

It was explained to them that they could win money

if they were accurate in rating the confidence of their
responses in this way (see Appendix C).
Materials
The subjects were given a packet of 100 4x6 in. index
cards, each card containing one general information
statement (see Appendix A).

They were also given an answer

sheet for their responses and ratings (see Appendix B).
Most of the general information questions used were taken
from a study by Nelson and Narens (1980) giving norms for
300 general-information questions.

Pilot studies were done

to design the present series of questions so that, on the
average, subjects from both age groups would be able to
answer approximately half of the questions accurately
(corrected for chance guessing).
Procedure
At the beginning of each session, subjects in both
groups were given Form 1 of the Quick Vocabulary test.

The

Quick Test is a brief individual intelligence test based on
perceptual-verbal performance.

Form 1 consists of four

line drawings, and subjects are asked to point to which of
the line drawings best represents each of the 50 worditems.

Three to ten minutes are required to administer the
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QT to any person who can see the drawings and hear or read
the word items.

Scores on the test were calculated

immediately after it was delivered, and subjects were
required to score 43 or above (approximately equivalent to
100 on a standardized I.Q. test) in order to receive the
100 general information question cards.

The young

subjects' X QT score was 44.74: for older subjects the
score= 46.75.

X

QT

·The subjects were told that they were being

given a vocabulary test.

If they asked for further

information, they were told that it was to help the
experimenter decide on which packet of questions to use.
All subjects were told that they had done well on the
vocabulary test, and then the rest of the procedure was
explained to them.
All subjects were told that this was a two-part study,
each part taking approximately 30 min ••

The subjects were

then given instructions relaying information about the
condition to which they had been assigned. (See Appendix C
for specific instructions).

All subjects were told to

respond true or false to each of the 100 statements on the
answer sheet provided, and to rate their confidence that
each of their responses Wqs correct on the six-point scale
provided for each response.

Subjects were told to take as

much time as they needed to make their responses and
ratings.
The experimenter stayed in the room with all the
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subjects in order to answer any questions they might have.
The experimenter read the questions to any of the older
subjects who requested this assistance.

Approximately 1/4

of the subjects requested this assistance.

After the

subjects had responded to and rated the responses to all
100 questions, the subjects were given a 5 to 10 minute
break.

During this time the experimenter corrected each

subjects' answer sheet, and computed the number of points
or pennies a subject had given as a confidence rating to
each incorrect decision they had made.
During the second part of the study, the subjects were
asked to do the same task again, using the same cards in
the same order.

They were then (a) given feedback about

how many points or pennies they had placed on their
incorrect decision while going through the task the first
time,

(b) urged to approach the questions as though they

were answering them for the first time, and (c) told to try
to be as accurate as they could be in their confidence
ratings (See Appendix C for detailed instructions for both
conflitions).

RESULTS
Many measures have been used in metacognitive studies
to evaluate confidence judgment performance.

Assessments

of over-confidence are most often evaluated by using
calibration curves.

The measures reported here include

calibration curves, along with numerical assessments of
over/underconfidence, calibration and resolution introduced
by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), and confidence
accuracy quotients, introduced by Zimmerman, Broder,
Shaughnessy and Underwood (1977).
Calibration curves provide a graphic evaluation of how
well calibrated subjects are.

A subject, or group of

subjects, are perfectly calibrated if, for all responses
assigned the same probability correct, the proportion
correct is equal to the probability assigned.

Therefore,

responses to which a perfectly calibrated subject assigns a
probability of being correct 80% of the time will be
correct 80% of the time. A graph showing the hit rate
(percentage correct) for each probability rating given is
called a calibration curve.
A perfectly calibrated subject would have a
"calibration curve" that lay completely on the diagonal;
meaning that responses they assigned .50 probability of
being correct would be correct 50% of the time, the
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responses they assigned a .60 probability of being correct
would be correct 60% of the time, and so on.

An

underconfident subject would have a calibration curve that
lay above the diagonal.

That would mean, for example, that

responses assigned a .50 probability correct may be correct
60% of the time, and those assigned a .60 probability
correct may be correct 65% of the time, and so on up the
probability scale.

The most common finding in confidence

judgment research is that subjects tend to be overconfident
(Lichtenstein, et al., 1982).

overconfident subjects show

calibration curves that lay below the diagonal.

For

example, when overconfident subjects gave responses a .50
probability rating, they may only be correct 45% of the
time, and for a .60 rating be correct only 50% of the time,
etc.
An equation measuring the adequacy of calibration was
proposed by Murphy (1973):

Calibration = 1/NE n (rt -c t )'.*
t: , ,

t:

*N=total number of responses
nt=number of times rtwas used
rt=probability rating
ct=probability correct for all items assigned
T=total number of response categories used

~
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A perfectly calibrated subject would score 0 on this
measure.

The worst possible score, 1.0, could be obtained

only by those who always give the highest probability
rating (absolutely sure) when wrong, and always

give the

lowest rating (total guess) when right.
Murphy (1973) also proposed an equation to measure
resolution.

Resolution measures the ability of the

responder to discriminate different degrees of subjective
uncertainty by sorting the responses into categories whose
respective ratings of percentage correct are maximally
different from the overall percentage correct. A flat
(horizontal) calibration curve shows no resolution: a
steeper curve shows good resolution.

The higher the

resolution score, the better the subjects resolution
ability.
The over/underconfidence measure is a simpler and more
commonly used measure of confidence judgment accuracy than
the calibration and resolution measures. The equation given
by Lichtenstein et al. (1977) is:
r

Over/underconfidence = 1/N~nt(~-c~).
t:•f

A rearrangement of the terms in this equation shows that
over/underconfidence is equal to the differences between
the mean of the probability responses and the overall
proportion correct.

Overconfidence is shown by a positive

score, underconfidence by a negative score.
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The final measure used to analyze confidence judgment
accuracy is the confidence accuracy quotient (CAQ). The CAQ
is a ratio, the numerator of which is the difference
between the mean confidence assigned to right items and
mean confidence assigned to wrong items, and a denominator
that is the square root of the pooled variance of the
subject's confidence judgments for right and wrong answers.
The CAQ is similar to

~

in a signal detection analysis,

and equals zero when a subject cannot discriminate right
and wrong answers.

The CAQ is affected by guessing in a

forced-choice procedure, like the two-alternative choice
situation (true or false) used in the present study
(Shaughnessy, 1979).

In this type of task, a certain

proportion of responses given a very low confidence rating
( for example .50) will be correct by chance.

Confidence

values assigned to these responses will tend to lower the
mean confidence of right answers, lessening the difference
between mean confidence for right and wrong answers.
Therefore, although the CAQ is still an accurate measure of
confidence accuracy in a two-alternative choice situation,
the CAQ scores in designs like the present study are likely
to be lower than for studies using an increased number of
alternatives (for example, four-item multiple choice
questions) from which to choose responses and give
confidence ratings.
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To be included in the following analyses, subjects had
to meet several criteria.

First, any subjects who answered

less than a chance level (50% of the items) correct were
not included in the final analyses, and only subjects who
participted in both Trials 1 and 2 of the experiment were
included.

The difference in the number of subjects used in

each comparison group is the result of careful subject
matching for proportion of correct responses.

Lichtenstein

et al., (1982) report that calibration differences between
groups of subjects can be affected by differences in
proportion of items subjects have responded to correctly.
The proportion of responses correct between groups must be
controlled.

The maximum number of young subjects in the

young subject comparison groups that resulted in the best
proportion correct "match" was 17 per group.

The maximum

number of subjects in the young versus older subjects
comparison groups was 14 per group, and the number of older
subjects being compared to other older subjects that
resulted in the best match was 12 per group. (All the young
subjects are taken from the same pool of 34 subjects that
met all the criteria for the experiment: the older subjects
are taken from the same pool of 28 subjects that met the
same criteria.)
No significant differences were found in proportion
correct between matched subjects in any of the comparison
groups, since the subjects had been matched so that
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proportion correct would be as similar as possible between
comparison groups.

The comparison groups to be discussed

include: comparisons between young and older subjects
(Tables 1-4) in both the money and no money conditions for
Trials 1 and 2: comparisons between young subjects in the
money and no money condition, and within each condition,
between Trials 1 and 2 (Tables S-8): and comparisons
between older subjects in the money and no money condition,
and within each condition, between Trials 1 and 2 (Tables 912). (Appendix D includes calibration curves for all the
subjects before matching took place).
Item analysis based on response performance revealed
that item difficulty distributions (ranging from number of
items correct by 100% of the subjects to number of items
correct by 0% of the subjects) for lists used by young and
older subjects in both money and no money conditions (n=l4
in each condition) on Trial 1 (Table 13) and Trial 2 (Table
14 ) were not significantly different. (Chi-square analysis
was used, and cells with errors of 9 or above were grouped
together to enable large enough frequencies for chi-square
analysis).

The item difficulty distribution pattern was

similar between the young and older subjects.

For example,

in Table 13, 33% of the items on Trial 1 were answered
incorrectly by 2 or fewer older subjects in the money
group, and similarly 32% of the items were answered
incorrectly by 2 or fewer of the younger subjects in the
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money group.

Within the same groups, 10% of the items were

answered incorrectly by 11-14 of the older subjects, and
12% of the items were answered incorrectly by 11-14% of the
younger subjects.
As previously discussed, the use of calibration curves
is the most common way to display confidence rating
results.

Calibration curves are shown in Figures 1-12.

In

order to construct the figures, the 0-5 point rating scale
that subjects used for their confidence judgments was first
converted to a .50 to 1.00 probability scale.

This

converted scale was also used to carry out the analyses of
the dependent variables (over/underconfidence, calibration,
resolution, etc.) summarized in Tables 1-12.

Significant

differences in these variables will be noted in Tables 112, and cited in the text.
Comparisons between young and older subjects
The calibration curve comparing young
subjects

(~=14)

in Figure 1.

(~=14)

and older

in the money condition of Trial 1 is shown

Both groups showed overconfidence at each

confidence rating level, except for the .50 level.

The

calibration curve for older subjects was closer to the
"perfect calibration" diagonal line at the lower rating
levels (.50-.70) than the curve for younger subjects, but
the younger subjects were better calibrated than the older
subjects at the .90 and 1.00 rating levels.

Table 1 shows

that there were no significant differences between the two
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groups in any of the confidence rating measures analyzed.
Figure 2 displays the calibration curves for younger
and older subjects on Trial 1 of the no money reinforcement
condition.

Although both groups again show overconfidence

in scale use, the older subjects are closer to the diagonal
calibration line than the younger subjects at the .60 and

.70 levels.

The only significant difference found in the

analyses between these groups shown in Table 2 was in the
resolution measure, where older subjects showed poorer
resolution, with a mean resolution score of .024, than the
younger subjects with .034, ~ (26)= 2.13, p< .05.

The

calibration curve for older subjects in Figure 2 is
"flatter" than the curve for younger subjects, reflecting
the resolution score difference between groups.
The calibration curves for young and older subjects in
the second trial of the money reinforcement condition is
seen in Figure 3.

The curve for younger subjects is closer

to the perfect calibration line for the .60 and .70
ratings, and also for the .90 and 1.00 ratings.
Significant differences in over/underconfidence and
calibration were found between the young and older groups
(Table 3).

Mean over/under confidence was .102 for young

subjects and .174 for older subjects, ~(26)= -2.60, p (.05.
The mean calibration score was .029 for young subjects and

.059 for older subjects t,(26)= -3.04, p< .05.

Younger

subjects had significantly higher resolution scores and
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lower confidence scores than older subjects; young subjects
average resolution score was .037, and older subjects score
was .018, ~(26)=3.51, E<-05.

The average confidence score

for young subjects was .751, and for older subjects .823,

-t(26)=

-3.09, p<.05.

-

On the second trial of the money

condition, then, younger subjects were better calibrated,
especially at the higher confidence rating levels.

Older

subjects were better calibrated at the lower levels, but
had flatter calibration curves, again reflecting their
poorer resolution abilities.
Figure 4 contains the calibration curves for young and
older subjects on Trial 2 of the no money reinforcement
condition.

Both groups of subjects were again

overconfident in their confidence ratings, although the
older subjects had a flatter line, being closer to the
perfect calibration line than the younger subjects at the
.60 and .80 levels.

As shown in Table 4, young and older

subjects were significantly different in only the CAQ and
resolution measures.

Young subjects were better than the

older subjects at discriminating correct from incorrect
answers.

The mean CAQ rating was .801 for younger subjects

and .488 for older subjects, _i(26)=2.73, g ( .05;

young

subjects showed better resolution, mean score .046, than
older subjects, with mean score .023, t(26)= 5.08, p (.05.
Therefore, in comparisons between young and older
subjects, in both money and no money conditions, on Trials
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1 and 2, significant differences in over/under confidence
and calibration were found only on the second trial of the
money condition {Table 3), where older subjects were
significantly more overconfident than younger subjects.
This performance difference on Trial 2 suggests that young
subjects seemed to be affected by simple feedback about
their overconfidence on Trial 1 more than the older
subjects were.

Younger subjects showed better resolution

than older subjects in each comparison except for that of
the first trial of the money condition.

This resulted in

the "flatter" calibration curves seen for the older
subjects, since they appeared less overconfident than the
younger subjects at the lower end of the rating scale, and
more overconfident at the higher end of the scale.
Young Subject Comparisons
Calibration curves for young subject comparisons
between Trials 1 and 2 of the money

{~=17}

(n=l7} condition are shown in Figures 5-8.

and no money
Figure 5 shows

that the calibration curves for young subjects between the
first trials of the money and no money condition were very
similar.

No significant differences were found between any

of the calibration measures listed in Table 5, suggesting
that young subject's made similar confidence rating
judgments, whether they made confidence ratings in terms of
a money scale or a number scale.
Calibration curves for the young subjects of the
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second trial for those in the money and no money conditions
are displayed in Figure 6.

Again, the calibration curves

for both groups are similar, and no significant differences
were found between the calibration measures listed in Table
6.
Figure 7 presents the calibration curves for young
subjects in the money condition on Trials 1 and 2.
Calibration improved at the .70 confidence rating level on
Trial 2, with some improvement also shown on Trial 2 at the
.90 and 1.00 level as well.

Significant differences

between these trials were found in the mean confidence,
over/under confidence and calibration measures with
subjects showing less overconfidence in their confidence
rating judgments on Trial 2.

On Trial 1, subjects showed a

higher mean confidence level of .780 as compared with .753
on Trial 2, ~{16)=3.59, p <.05. On Trial 1, subjects showed
a mean over/underconfidence score of .117 and on Trial 2 of
.085, t{l6)= 3.37, p(.05, and on the first trial, subjects
in the money condition had an average calibration score of
.035, and on the second trial a mean calibration score of
.025, t{l6)=3.42, 2(.05.

Therefore, it appears that young

subjects in the money condition were affected by feedback
about their Trial 1 performance, making more cautious
ratings during Trial 2 than they had during Trial 1.
Calibration curves on Trials 1 and 2 of young subjects
in the no money condition are shown in Figure 8.

The
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curves are similar, with the exception of the .70
confidence rating.

Subject ratings on Trial 2 were closer

to the perfect calibration line than the ratings on Trial
1.

Significant differences were found between Trials 1 and

2 for mean confidence ratings,

.797 on Trial 1 and .772 on

Trial 2, ~(16)= 4.16, p(.05, and for resolution, with a
mean resolution of .033 on Trial 1 and .044 on Trial 2,
~(16) = -3.68, p(.05.

However, no significant differences

were found between trials in calibration or
over/underconfidence measures.

Feedback appeared to have

some affect on young subjects in the no money condition,
although it did not affect their confidence judgments as
much as it affected the young subjects in the money
condition.
For young subjects then, comparisons between young
subjects in the money and no money conditions displayed
significant differences in over/underconfidence and
calibration measures only between Trials 1 and 2 of the
money condition, where subjects were better calibrated on
the second trial, after feedback had been given.
Older Subject Comparisons
Calibration curves are presented in Figure 9 for older
subjects on Trial 1 between the money and no money
condition.

Both groups showed overconfidence, with the

curves overlapping so that the no money subjects were
better calibrated at the .60,.70 and .90 rating levels, and
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the money subjects better calibrated at the other rating
levels.

No significant differences were found between the

money and no money conditions for the confidence rating
measures shown in Table 9, indicating that on Trial 1,
older subjects, like younger subjects, showed few
differences between confidence ratings made using a money
scale versus those made using a number scale.
Figure 10 shows calibration curves for older subjects
in the money and no money conditions of Trial 2.

Subjects

in the no money condition were closer to the perfect
calibration line for the .50 and .70 confidence rating
levels than were subjects in the money condition, although
the calibration lines are similar for .80-1.00 confidence
ratings.

Again, no significant differences were found

between the money and no money conditions for the
confidence rating measures shown in Table 10.
Figure 11 presents comparisons of calibration curves
for older subjects in the money condition between Trials 1
and 2.

The curves here overlap, with subjects on Trial 1

being closer to the diagonal line for confidence ratings
.60 and .70, and subjects on Trial 2 having points on the
curve closer to the diagonal line for the .80 and .90
levels.

No significant differences between trials were

found for the measures listed in Table 11.

The confidnence

ratings of older subjects, then, were not effected as much
as the ratings of younger subjects after feedback about
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their Trial 1 performance in the money condition.
Figure 12 displays calibration curves for older
subjects in the no money condition between Trials 1 and 2.
Subjects in Trial 1 have a calibration curve closer to the
perfect calibration line at the .70,

.90 and 1.00 levels.

Significant differences between Trials 1 and 2 were found
for mean confidence and over/under confidence measures.
Mean confidence on Trial 1 was .804, and Trial 2 .825,

-t(ll)=-2.85, -p

(.05, and mean over/under confidence was

.144 on Trial 1 and .167.

In the no money condition, older

subjects displayed more overconfidence in their confidence
ratings after they had received feedback about their Trial
1 performance.

This is a pattern that is nearly opposite

to that shown by younger subjects, who were less
overconfident

in the no money condition.

For older subjects then, significant differences in
confidence and over/under confidence were found only
between Trials 1 and 2 of the no money condition.

These

subjects appeared to be more overconfident in their
confidence judgments on Trial 2 than they were on Trial 1.
Confidence Rating Scale Comparisons
Young and older subjects did use the confidence scale
differently.

Table 15 displays the total distribution

scale for young and older subjects in both money and no
money conditions (n=l4 each), on Trial 1 , and Table 16 on
Trial 2.

Chi-square analysis of both tables yielded

significant results.

On

.

Tr~al

1, vz.
~ (15)= 278.45, p

-

-

and for Trial 2, Xz(l5)= 444.06, p (.05.

-

-

<.05, 53

On Trial 1, the

largest differences in scale use are seen between the young
and older subjects in the money condition. Younger subjects
were more likely to choose the lower ratings (0,1 and 2)
with 45.71% of their ratings given to these ratings as
compared to 34.57% of ratings at these lower levels for the
older subjects in the money condition.

These older

subjects were also more likely to choose the highest rating
of 5 (41.86% of their ratings) as compared to 28.29% of the
younger subjects ratings given to the highest scale level.
On Trial 2, differences in scale use are seen between
younger and older subjects in both the money and no money
conditions.

For example, older subjects in the money

condition used the lower scale levels (0-2) 33.64% of the
time, and in the no money condition, 28.86%, compared to
younger subjects who used the lower scale levels
frequently,

mor~

50.86% for those in the money condition, and

41% for those in the no money condition.
The frequency of answer and rating changes between
Trials 1 and 2 for all conditions,

and the patterns of

those changes are shown in Tables 17 and 18.

Table 17

shows the average number of answers and ratings that were
changed from incorrect to correct, or from correct to
incorrect. Descriptive analysis of the pattern of the
number of answers and ratings was similar between the four

54
groups, with a mean of 14.6 answers changed between Trials
1 and 2, approximately half of these changes (7.33) from
correct to incorrect, and the other half (7.29) from
incorrect to correct.

Also, approximately half the answers

were changed without an accompanying rating change.

Of the

average total ratings changed (41.34), 82% were changed
without an accompanying answer change.

For all groups

then, subjects were unlikely to change their answers
between Trials 1 and 2, but they did change a substantial
number of their ratings.
The direction of the rating changes is shown in Table
18.

Overall, 58.66% of the ratings given to responses on

Trial 1 were not changed by subjects on Trial 2.

For young

subjects in the money condition 56.5% of their ratings
remained the same between Trials 1 and 2; for young
subjects in the no money condition, 60.2% were not changed.
For older subjects in the money condition, 59.4% of the
ratings were not changed from Trial 1 to 2, and 58.7% were
not changed for older subjects in the no money condition.
Of the rating changes made, young subjects in both
conditions were more likely to change from higher ratings
to lower ratings, showing less confidence in their answers
on Trial 2 than on Trial 1.

For young subjects in the

money condition, 68% of their rating changes were from
higher ratings to lower ratings, and similarly, 69% of the
changes for young subjects in the no money condition were
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from higher ratings on Trial 1 to lower ratings on Trial 2.
This suggests that rating changes were not made randomly,
and may have been a reaction to the feedback that subjects
received between Trials 1 and 2.
For older subjects in the money condition, almost as
many of their rating changes were from high to low (45.20%)
as from low to high (54.8%) between Trials 1 and 2.

Older

subjects in the no money condition showed a rating change
pattern that was different from the younger subjects
pattern, with 61.2% of their rating changes going from
lower ratings on Trial 1 to higher ratings on Trial 2.
Older subjects in the money condition seemed to display a
random pattern of rating changes, whereas the pattern for
subjects in the no money condition indicated a tendency to
give higher ratings to answers on Trial 2 than on Trial 1.
In summary, young and older subjects showed
significant calibration differences only on Trial 2 of the
money condition, where younger subjects were better
calibrated than older subjects. Also, younger subjects
showed an overall better resolution ability than older
subjects.
Comparisons for younger subjects in the money and no
money conditions indicated that feedback did have an effect
on these subjects. Subjects in the money condition showed
better calibration on Trial 2, after feedback on their
Trial 1 performance, than they had shown on Trial 1.

Young
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subjects in the no money condition had lower mean
confidence on Trial 2 than on Trial 1, also indicating
lower confidence judgments after feedback.
Comparisons for older subjects found significant
differences only between Trial 1 and 2 of the no money
condition, where subjects appeared more overconfident on
Trial 2, after feedback on their performance, than on Trial
1.

DISCUSSION

The basic goal of the present study was to examine the
effects of three variables on subject confidence judgment
accuracy.

These three variables were:

feedback given to

subjects about their performance: monetary incentive: and
most importantly, the age of the subjects.
The effects of feedback on confidence judgments will
be discussed first.

An overview of the results indicated

that feedback seemed to have more of an effect on the
confidence judgments of younger subjects than on older
subjects.

The next effect to be discussed will be the

effect of monetary incentive

on confidence judgments.

The

results suggested that, although there seemed to be no
dramatic changes between the confidence judgments of
subjects using "money bets 11 to make their confidence
ratings, and those using a simple number scale, the young
"money incentive" subjects, at least, seemed to show less
overconfidence between Trials 1 and 2 than the subjects in
the "no money incentive" condition.

Finally, overall

confidence judgment differences between young and older
subjects will be discussed.

In general, older subjects

seemed to use the confidence rating scale differently than
young subjects.

They showed poorer "resolution", or

ability to sort their ratings into different scale levels.
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This resulted in "flatter" calibration curves for the older
subjects than for the younger subjects, since they were
less overconfident than younger subjects at the lower end
of the confidence rating scale (.50 and .60 ratings) and
more overconfident at the higher end of the scale (1.00
ratings).
Feedback
Several previous studies have indicated that subjects
can be "trained" to produce more realistic confidence
ratings by giving them •• feedback 11 about their performance.
Lichtenstein et al. (1980) gave subjects comprehensive
feedback, over multiple training sessions, about their
confidence judgments.

Subjects did show improved ratings,

with most of the improvement occuring after the first
training session.

Zechmeister et al. (1986) have also

shown that one training session can help subjects,
especially low achieving subjects, improve their
calibration scores, and Arkes et al. (1982) found that even

in the absence of training, simply informing subjects that
they will have to explain their reasons for their answer
choices, to other subjects, helps to improve subject
calibration.
In the present study, the feedback was brief and
intentionally "vague".

Subjects were simply provided with

a number indicating, in the no money condition, the number
of "points" that corresponded to their ratings of incorrect

answers.

For the money condition, the feedback given was
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the number of pennies that the subjects would have lost
during Trial 1 on "bet ratings" given to incorrect answers.
All subjects were then told that this feedback meant that
they had been overconfident in some of their ratings,
giving high confidence judgments to some of their incorrect
answers.

They were told to be as accurate as they could be

on the second trial. "Money condition" subjects were told
that they could win back some of the money they had lost if
they were more accurate in their ratings on the second
trial.
Young subjects did seem to be affected by this
feedback, showing less overconfidence in the confidence
judgments on Trial 2, after feedback, than they had shown
in their Trial 1 judgments.

This is reflected in the lower

confidence, over/under confidence, and calibration scores
shown on Trial 2 for young subjects in the money condition,
and lower confidence ratings on Trial 2 for young subjects
in the no money condition. Young subjects in both groups
changed approximately 40% of their ratings between Trials 1
and 2, with almost 70% of these changes indicating less
overconfidence on Trial 2, i.e., with lower ratings on
Trial 2 than had been chosen on Trial 1.

It seems, then,

that for college aged subjects, even brief feedback about
"overconfidence" can affect subject confidence judgment
ratings.
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The effect of feedback on older subjects is not clear.
There were no statistically significant differences between
the Trial 1 and Trial 2 performances for older subjects in
the money condition.

These older subjects, like the

younger subjects, did change about 40% of their ratings
between Trial 1 and Trial 2.

However, these changes seemed

almost "random", with approximately half of the changes
going from lower ratings on Trial 1 to higher ratings on
Trial 2, and the other half of the changes going from high
ratings on Trial 1 to lower ratings on Trial 2.
Older subjects did seem to show more "fatigue" on
Trial 2 than younger subjects, and may have been exhibiting
less concentration on their Trial 2 ratings than they
exhibited on their Trial 1 ratings.

But even if this were

true, it does not adequately explain the rating changes
seen between Trial 1 and 2 for the older subjects in the no
money condition.
In the no money condition, older subjects appeared to
be more overconfident after feedback than they were before
they received feedback.
had been expected.

This result was opposite of what

Again, like older and younger subjects

in the other conditions, these older subjects changed
approximately 40% of their ratings.

Of these rating

changes, over 60% were from lower ratings on Trial 1 to
higher ratings on Trial 2.

Although this pattern of rating
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changes is not as dramatic as the rating changes shown for
young subject (from high ratings on Trial 1 to lower
ratings on Trial 2), it was reflected in significantly
higher confidence and over/under confidence measures on
Trial 2 than on Trial 1.

One explanation for this pattern

may be the greater "familiarity" that subjects had with the
material on Trial 2 than they had had with it on Trial 1.
These older subjects may have reasoned "I've heard that
answer before, therefore I'm confident it is correct".

For

example, Hasher, Goldstein and Toppino (1977) found that
repeated general information statements were more likely to
be judged as "true" than similar, non-repeated statements.
Both young and older subjects were likely to make the
same answer responses on Trial 2 that they had made on
Trial 1.

For example, these older subjects in the no monay

condition changed only 13% of their answers between Trial 1
and 2, and so they were "familiar"
Trial 2.

with these answers on

In the absence of any "monetary" incentive to

temper their responses, the older subjects in the no money
condition may have been more likely to choose their
confidence ratings based on "familiarity" with the
material.
Interaction Between Feedback and Monetary Incentive
Fischhoff et al. (1977) found that subjects were
"overconfidently" willing to stake money on confidence
judgments that they had already made.

"Betting" money on
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their judgments did not cause subjects to respond
cautiously, since most subjects in the study would have
lost money if these bets had been real.

The present study

examined whether having subjects make money bets as
confidence ratings would make subjects more cautious in
their responses.
Monetary incentive did not have a significant effect
on subject confidence judgments on Trial 1, since the
confidence judgment measures between the money and no money
conditions for the Trial 1 ratings were not significantly
different for the younger or older subject groups.
Although there were no significant differences between the
money and no money conditions on Trial 1 for either age
group, young subjects in the money condition did use the
scale differently than young subjects in the no money
condition.

In the money condition, young subjects were

less likely to use the highest rating level of 1.00 (used
only 28.3% of the time) than were subjects in the no money
condition, who used the highest rating level 37.5% of the
time on Trial 1.

This indicates the possibility that money

could have influenced the young subjects in the money
condition by causing them to be less likely to want to
"bet" the highest amount of money on the accuracy of their
responses than young subjects in the no money condition.
It is possible that the low amount of money at stake (penny
bets) made it less likely that there would be "significant"
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differences between the two groups than if higher money
stakes had been used.
Younger subjects did appear to be less overconfident

in both the money and no money conditions after they had
received feedback.

This effect was most apparent in the

money condition, where subjects showed lower
over/underconfidence and calibration scores, as well as
lower confidence scores, on Trial 2.

Since using a

11

money 11

scale did not cause subjects to make different confidence
judgments than those made when using a

11

point scale 11 on

Trial 1, it is likely that the use of this

11

low wager ..

money scale cannot completely account for the differences
between Trials 1 and 2 for the money and no money
conditions.
It is true that subjects in the money groups were
given a monetary incentive to work toward on Trial 2 that
was not given to the no money groups, since the money
groups were told that they could win back some of the money
they had lost by givng more accurate ratings on the second
trial.

But the feedback given to subjects

groups between Trials 1 and 2 was also more

in the money
11

COncrete 11 than

the feedback given to subjects in the no money group.
Subjects in the money group were given feedback about the
amount of pennies (a concrete example) that they had lost
by giving overconfident ratings to incorrect answers,
whereas the no money group was given feedback about the
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amount of points (a more abstract concept) that they had
given in ratings to incorrect answers.
Both groups of young subjects, therefore, were more
likely to make confidence rating changes that resulted in
less overconfidence on Trial 2. It has also been shown that
monetary incentive alone did not have a significant effect
on the young subject's ratings on Trial 1.

It may be,

then, that the greater difference between Trials 1 and 2 of
the money condition as compared to the difference in
calibration of Trials 1 and 2 of the no money condition can
be accounted for more by the "concreteness" of the feedback
given, than by the monetary incentive indicated.
Confidence judgment results were also different
between Trial 1 and Trial 2 for older subjects in both the
money and no money conditions.

As stated earlier, older

subjects in the money condition appeared to make random
rating changes between Trials 1 and 2, with no significant
confidence judgment differences between trials.

Older

subjects in the no money condition showed more
overconfidence through their ratings on Trial 2.

The brief

feedback given to subjects about their ratings on Trial 1
did not seem to have much of an effect on the Trial 2
confidence ratings of the older subjects.
It may be that there was a tendency for both groups of
older subjects to become more overconfident on Trial 2,
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because of the greater .. familiarity" of the material. P..s
already suggested, it is also possible that there is a
"fatigue" factor involved, with older subjects being more
tired of the task on Trial 2.

This may have caused them to

pay less attention to their Trial 2 ratings.
This possible tendency to be overconfident on Trial 2
may have been "tempered .. somewhat by the more "concrete"
feedback given to the older subjects in the money group.
This hypothesis could help to explain the "seemingly
random" rating changes shown by the older subjects in the
money group.

They may have been likely to give higher

ratings to answers that now, on Trial 2 seemed more
familiar, but also to keep the feedback about their
overconfidence in mind, which could have resulted in less
overconfidence in those answers that still seemed
unfamiliar.
Age Differences
Other studies examining age differences in confidence
ratings have indicated no significant differences between
young and older adults (Perlmutter,l978:Lachman et
al,l979). It is interesting to note, therefore, the
different confidence rating patterns seen between young and
older subjects in this experiment.
Most of the differences between age groups, as already
mentioned, seemed to occur during Trial 2 of the study.
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For example, in the

11

money condition,. comparisons, young

subjects were significatly less overconfident than older
subjects, on Trial 2.

The rating scale was used

differently by young and older subjects of both groups for
both trials, but the dramatic differences were seen on
Trial 2.

For example, 43.4% of the older subject's ratings

on Trial 2 of the money condition were made at the highest
1.00 level, and 43.7% of the older no money subjects
ratings.

This contrasts with only 27% of the young money

subjects ratings and 36.7% of the money subject's ratings
given to the highest 1.00 rating level.
Although the highest number of ratings for both age
groups occurred at the 1.00 level, older subjects were more
likely to choose this rating on both trials than were the
younger subjects.

Botwinick (1969) indicated that the

older subjects in his experiment were more likely to choose
the most extreme response (in the case of his experiment,
the most cautious response) than were younger subjects.
When this extreme response was not available to them, they
showed the same pattern of responses as younger subjects.
It may be that older subjects, who may have had less recent
experience with test taking than younger subjects, have a
more difficult time in simply using the rating scale than
younger subjects.
11

The older subjects did tend to have

flatter" calibration curves, reflecting problems in

sorting their ratings into different levels of uncertainty
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that could best reflect the actual confidence they had in
their responses.

As Perlmutter et al.(l978) and Zivian et

al. (1983) pointed out, being

11

in or out of school" may be

more of a factor in explaining differences between groups
in metacognitive skills than are age differences.
Implications of the Present Study
Cavanaugh and Perlmutter (1982), in a critical
examination of metacognitive research, concluded that the
value in this research has been its demonstration of
metacognitive ability differences between different groups
of subjects, and the weaknesses in this research have
centered around the inability of these studies to show a
direct relationship between metamemory ability and memory
performance.

The present study is valuable as a

demonstration of differences in the confidence rating
patterns of young and older adults.

However, future

research needs to examine how metacognitive knowledge is
acquired, and how it is related to memory performance.
There is also a need to demonstrate how the
metacognitive tasks that researchers have used relate to
"real" memory monitoring skills of people in everyday
situations.

In confidence judgement tasks, for example,

researchers need to demonstrate that changes made by
subjects in the use of the confidence scale reflect actual
changes in their metacognitive skills.
Tulving and Madigan (1970) commented that research
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concerned with "knowledge o.f our own knowlegde" may be one
of the most important areas to explore in advancing our
insights about memory processes.

In order to provide this

insight, metacognitive research will need to go beyond
testing subject performance on single metacognitive tasks,
and instead establish a standard procedure of using
multiple assessments of memory knowledge to analyze
metacognitive abilities.
In conclusion, the results of the present study
indicate that even brief feedback about overconfidence may
have some effect on lowering the overconfidence of young
subjects.

The results suggest that using a "money" rating

scale, where subjects could win or lose money depending on
the accuracy of their confidence ratings, may lead young
subjects to be less overconfident in their ratings,
especially if more money was at stake than in the present
study.

Finally, older subjects seem to have more

"resolution" problems in using the rating scales provided
than do younger subjects, and older subjects are more
likely than younger subjects to choose the most extreme
1. 00 rating.

Money incentives and feedback seem to have little
effect on the confidence ratings of older subjects.

Older

subjects may have become more tired and/or bored with this
task as time went on, than younger subjects.

Older

subjects may also have been effected by the "familiarity"

of the task on Trial 2.
Since young and older subjects did show similar
ratings on Trial 1, there is no reason to believe that
older subjects may actually be different in confidence
rating skills than are younger subjects.

Subjects of any

age who are not familiar with rating scales, and not used
to taking tests, may show the same confidence judgment
11

patterns 11 shown by the older subjects in this experiment.
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Table 1
Performance of young and older subjects on the first trial
of the money reinforcement condition N=l4.
Measure

YMl

X

64.5

64.5

0.0

.773

.816

-1.80

X Over-Under Conf .128

.171

-1.58

X CAQ

.605

.465

1.21

X Calibration

.039

.058

-1.97

X Resolution

.034

.024

1.53

Correct

X Confidence

OMl

t

value

Table 2
Performance of young and older subjects on the first trial
of the no money reinforcement condition ...N.=l4.
Measure

YNMl

ONMl

t value

X Correct

66.93

66.79

0.05

X Confidence

.812

.808

0.15

X Over-Under Conf .143

.140

0.07

X CAQ

.681

.485

1.46

X Calibration

.045

.05

-0.40

X Resolution

.034

.024

2.13*

*2 (.05
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Table 3
Performance of young and older subjects on trial 2 of the
money reinforcement condition ~=14
Measure

YM2

OM2

t value

X Correct

64.93

64.86

0.03

X Confidence

.751

.823

-3.09*

X Over-Under Conf • H'J2

.174

-2.60*

X CAQ

.694

.428

2.28*

X Calibration

.029

.059

-3.04*

X Resolution

.037

.018

3.51*

Table 4
Performance of young and older subjects on the second trial
of the no money reinforcement condition N=l4
Measure

YNM2

ONM2

t value

X Correct

65.71

65.79

-0.03

x·

.785

.833

-1.93

X Over-Under Conf .128

.175

-1.35

X CAQ

.801

.488

2.73*

"X Calibration

.045

.060

-1.01

X Resolution

.046

.023

5.08*

Confidence

*£ (. 05
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Table 5
Performance of young subjects on trial 1 of the money and
no money conditions.N=l7
Measure

YMl

YNMl

t value

X Correct

66.29

66.76

-0.21

X Confidence

.780

.797

-0.93

X Over-Under Conf .117

.130

-0.54

X CAQ

.726

.698

0.25

X Calibration

.035

.039

-0.58

X Resolution

.037

.033

0.71

Table 6
Performance of young subjects on trial 2 of the money and
no money conditions. N=l7
Heasure

YM2

YNM2

t

value

X Correct

66.82

66.18

0.28

X Confidence

.753

.772

-1.05

X Over-Under Conf .085

.110

-0.99

X CAQ

.780

.777

X Calibration

.025

.040

-1.71

X Resolution

.038

.044

-1.27
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Table 7
Performance of young subjects in trials 1 and 2 of the
money reinforcement condition. E=l7
Measure

YMl

YM2

t value

X Correct

66.29

66.82

-0.67

X Confidence

.780

.753

3.59*

X Over-Under Conf .• 117

.085

3.37*

X CAQ

.726

.780

-0.90

X Calibration

.035

.025

3.42*

X Resolution

.037

.038

-0.05

Table 8
Performance of young subjects for trials 1 and 2 of the no
money reinforcement conditions. ]l=l7
Measure

YNMl

YNM2

t value

-x·

Correct

66.76

66.18

0.71

X Confidence

.797

.772

4.16*

X Over-Under Conf .. 130

.110

2.08

X CAQ

.698

.777

-1.51

X Calibration

.039

.040

-0.33

X Resolution

.033

.044

-3.68*
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Table 9
Performance of older subjects on the first trial of the
money and no money reinforcement conditions. H=l2
Measure

OMl

ONMl

t value

X Correct

65.58

66

-0.14

X Confidence

.806

.804

0.04

X Over-Under Conf •• 150

.144

0.16

-x·

CAQ

.507

.453

0.34

X

Calibration

.050

.054

-0.29

.026

.024

0.39

X Resolution

Table 10
Performance of older subjects on trial 2 of the money and
no money reinforcement conditions. ..N=l2
Measure

OM2

ONM2

t value

X Correct

65.75

65.83

-0.02

X Confidence

.814

.825

-0.37

-x Over-Under Conf •• l56

.167

-0.28

X CAQ

.475

•• 483

-0.06

X Calibration

.052

.057

-0.31

"'X Resolution

.02

.022

-0.34
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Table 11
Performance of older subjects on the first and second
trials of the money reinforcement condition. N=l2
Measure

OMl

OM2

t value

X Correct

65.58

65.75

-0.12

X Confidence

.806

.814

-.84

X Over-Under conf .• 150

.156

-.40

X CAQ

.507

.475

0.37

·x

.050

.052

-0.32

.026

.02

1.28

Calibration

X Resolution

Table 12
Performance of older subjects on trial 1 and 2 of the no
money reinforcement condition. li=12
ONMl

ONM2

t value

X Correct

66.00

65.83

0.23

·x

.804

.825

-2.85*

"X Over-Under Conf •. 144

.167

-2.36*

'"X CAQ

.453

.483

-0.51

"X Calibration

.054

.057

-.68

Y Resolution

.024

.022

0.57

r-teasure

Confidence
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Table 13

Item Difficulty Distributions of Test Lists Used by Young
and Older Subjects on Trial 1 of the Money and No Money
Conditions*

Number of Errors
0-2
Older
Money
Trial 1

3-4

5-6

7-8

9-10

11-12

13-14

33

15

18

13

11

7

3

34

20

17

13

8

7

1

Young
Honey
Trial 1

32

17

20

13

6

9

3

No Money
Trial 1

31

20

19

19

7

1

3

No Money
Trial 1

*This table lists the number of test items at each
difficulty level.

There were 14 subjects in each of the

four conditions shown
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Table 14
Item Difficulty Distributions of Test Lists Used by Young
and Older Subjects on Trial 2 of the Money and No Money
Conditions*

Number of Errors
0-2
Older
Money
Trial 2
No Money
Trial 2
Young
Honey
Trial 2
No Money
Trial 2

3-4

5-6

7-8

9-10

11-12

32

12

24

16

9

5

2

34

13

18

18

10

7

0

27

22

19

15

6

9

2

31

18

18

19

10

1

3

*This table lists the number of test items at each
level.

13-14

There were 14 subjects in each of the four

conditions shown.
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Table 15
Total Frequency of Use of the 6 Point Rating Scale (Ratings
from 0 to 5)*
Rating Scale
1

2

3

4

5

Older
Money
Trial 1

227

91

166

244

86

586

Older
No Money
Trial 1

312

74

99

174

185

556

Young
Money
Trial 1

259

198

183

178

186

396

Young
No Money
Trial 1

286

82

106

161

240

525

*Trial 1 of Young and Older Subjects in the Money and No
Money Conditions

(~=14

per condition)
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Table 16
Total Frequency of Use of the 6 Point Rating Scale (Ratings
from 0 to 5)*
Rating Scale
4

5

1

2

3

226

43

202

249

72

608

256

59

89

177

207

612

327

230

155

156

153

379

349

118

107

160

152

514

Older
Money
Trial 2
Older
No Money
Trial 2
Young
Money
Trial 2
Young
No Money
Trial 2

*Trial 2 of Young and Older Subjects in the Money and No
t-Ioney Conditions (n=l4 per condition)
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Table 17
Average number of rating and answer changes between Trials
1 and 2 for each condition.

IX
Groups

~swers Answers Answers Ratings
IX
klswers Ratings ~hanged Changed Changed Changed
Changed ~hanged ~o Wron~ to Right Alone
Alone

Ratings
&Answers
Both Changed

Young
r~oney

13. 12

6.29

43.4 7

6.83

Young
No Money
(n=17)

6.18

36.53

6.94

7. 71

9.00

32.82

7.00

8.17

7. 6 7

32.08

8.50

•

(n= 17)

I

16.00

39.82

8.29
j

Older
l~oney

16. 17

40.58

8.00

(n=12)

-

I

01 der
flo Honey
( n= 12)

Overall
t'e ans

:
13.17

14.60

41.25

141. 34

6. 6 7

I
l

6.50

5. 75

33.83

7.42

•
7. 33

7. 29

7. 22

33.97

7. 38

81
Table 18
Direction of rating changes between Trials 1 and 2.

Young Money

(n=l7)

Young No r-t>ney

{n= 17)

Trial 2
Trial

.so

.60 • 70 .80 .90

.so

9
!11

.60
.70
.80
.90
1.00

4

11

10

.so

.60
70
80
.90
1. 00
0

0

12
7

(n= 12)

01 der No Money

Tria 1 2
.SO .60 .70 .RO .90 1.00
~ 2:>
9
3
14
0~1 ~0 17
2
11
22 12 5~ 7 21

IS

3
19

9

1
4

3 83
7 1
8

36

4
3

.60
• 70
.80
.90
1.00

1425

01 der Money
Trial 1

.so

3

4
39

Trial

~

4
1:l

19
9

1

Trial

.so

.60
• 70
.80
.90
1.00

1
1

{n=l2)
1. 00
8
9
11
24
44
1

The boxed numbers show the amount of ratings that were not
changed between Trials 1 and 2 at each rating level.
Numbers to the left of the boxed-in values are the amount
of ratings that were changed from a higher rating on Trial
1 to a lower rating on Trial 2.
(Note: underlined numbers
show levels at which subjects were more than twice as
likely to change their ratings to lower ratings, i.e. show
less confidence in the accuracy of their answer, than to
change their ratings from lower ratings on Trial 1 to
higher ratings on Trial 2.) Numbers to the right of the
boxed-in numbers show the amount of ratings that were
changed from a lower rating value to a higher rating value
between Trials 1 and 2.
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~ .80·

a::
a::
0

u .70
a.:

___ _.

0
a:: 60·
a..·
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I

I

I

I

I

I

•

I

.50-

.40
.50

.60

.70

.80

.90

1.00

CONFIDENCE

Figure 1. Calibration curves of young and older subjects
on Trial 1 of the money reinforcement condition. The young
and older subjects were matched for proportion correct on
the general information test (N=l4).
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1.00-

YNM1•

e

ONMlA--.
.90
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u
.8
Ll..l
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0
u .70
a.:
0

~ .60
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.60

.70

.80

.90

1.00

CONFIDENCE

Figure 2. Calibration curves of the young and older
subjects on Trial 1 of the no money reinforcement
condition. Young and older subjects were matched for
number correct {N=l4).
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Figure 3. Calibration curves for the young and older
subjects on Trial 2 of the money reinforcement condition.
Young and older subjects were matched for proportion
correct (N=l4) .
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Figure 4. Calibration curves for the young and older
subjects on Trial 2 in the no money reinforcement
condition. Young and older subjects were matched for
proportion correct (N=l4).

86

1.00·

YM J •
YNM1e

•

•

.90
1-

~

a::
a::
0

lJ

.80·

.70

a:

0

a:: 60·
CL•

.so .
.40
.50

.60

.70

.80

.90

7.00

CONFIDENCE

Figure 5. Calibration curves for young subjects on Trial 1
of the money and no money reinforcement conditions. Money
and no money subjects were matched for proportion correct
{N=l7).

87

1.00

YM2• •
YNM2• e

.90
1-

u
.80
LU
~
~

0
u .70
~

0

~ .60

.so-

.40

.so

.60

.70

.80

.90

1.00

CONFIDENCE

Figure 6. Calibration curves for young subjects on Trial 2
of the money and no money conditons. Money and no money
subjects were matched for proportion correct (N=l7).

88

1.00·

YM1 • •
YM2CJ--CJ

.90

....

~ .80·

a:::
a:::

0

u .70
a.:
0
a::: 60·
a..·
.SO·

.40

.so

.60

.70

.80

.90

1.00

CONFIDENCE

Figure 7. Calibration curves for young subjects on Trial 1
and 2 of the money reinforcement conditions. Subjects were
matched for proportion correct so that the subjects on
Trial 1 are the same as those in Trial 2 (N=l7).
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Figure 8. Calibration curves for the
between Trial 1 and Trial 2 of the no
condition. Subjects were matched for
that subjects on Trial 1 are the same
(N=l7).

young subjects
money reinforcement
proportion correct so
as those on Trial 2
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Figure 9. Calibration curves for the older subjects on
Trial 1 of the money and no money reinforcement conditions.
Subjects in the money and no money conditions were matched
for proportion correct (N=l2).
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Figure 10. Calibration curves for older subjects on Trial
2 of the money and no money reinforcement conditions.
Subjects in the money and no money conditions were matched
for proportion correct (N=l2).
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Figure 11.
Calibration curves for older subjects between
Trial 1 and Trial 2 of the money reinforcement condition.
Subjects were matched for proportion correct so that the
subjects on Trial 1 are the same subjects as those on Trial
2 (N=l2).
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Figure 12. Calibration curves for older subjects between
Trial 1 and Trial 2 of the no money reinforcement
condition. Subjects were matched for proportion correct so
that the subjects in Trial 1 are the same subjects as those
in Trial 2 (N=l2).
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The following are the statements that subjects responded
true or false to. Correct answers are on the answer sheet
(Appendix B):
1. The capitol of France is Paris.
2. The Bismarck is the name of Germany's largest
battleship that was sunk in World War II.
3. The Hague is located in Belgium.
4. Popeye is the name of the cartoon character who eats
spinach.
5. Raymond is the last name of the doctor who performed
the first successful human heart transplant.
6. There are 2.54 centimeters in an inch (to the nearest
hundreth).
7. Amigo is the name of the Lone Ranger's Indian sidekick.
8. Montgomery was the last name of the actor who portrayed
the father on the television show "Father Knows Best".
9. Ibsen wrote the "Iceman Cometh" •
10. Salk is the last name of the doctor who first
developed a vaccine against polio.
11. Dormancy is the name of the long sleep that some
animals go through during the entire winter.
12. Ravel composed "Claire de lune".
13. Thunder was the name of Roy Roger's dog.
14. The pancreas is the name of the organ that produces
insulin.
15. The island of Sardinia is located in the Mediterranean
sea.
16. Rockwell is the last name of the artist who painted
"American Gothic".
17. Migraine is the name of the severe headache that
returns periodically and often is accompanied by nausea.
18. The French Revolution began in 1730.
19. Orion is the name of the north star.
20. Hockey is the sport in which the Stanley Cup is
awarded.
21. C6Hl206 is the chemical formula for dextrose (grape
sugar).
22. A javelin is the name of the spear-like object that is
thrown during a track meet.
23. Shakespeare is the last name of the man who wrote
"Canterbury Tales••.
24. Picasso painted ••The Three Musicians".
25. Dillenger is the last name of the criminal who was
killed by FBI agents outside of a Chicago movie theater.
26. The first air raid occurred in 1849.
27. The Magna Charta was signed in 1320.
28. The visual area of the brain is located in the temporal
lobe.
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29. Nightengale is the last name of the woman who founded
the American Red Cross.
30. Descarte wrote the Dioptrice.
31. Backus is the last name of the man who was the voice
of Mr. Magoo •
32. A sextant is the name of the navigation instrument
used at sea to plot position relative to the magnetic North
Pole.
33. Anthony is the last name of Flash's girlfriend in the
comic strip "Flash Gordon".
34. In addition to the Kentucky Derby and the Belmont
Stakes, the Preakness is the horse race that completes the
triple crown.
35. Bush is the last name of the vice-president under the
Reagan administration.
36. Gagarin is the last name of the cosmonaut who was the
first person to orbit around the earth.
37. Granger was the last name of Billy the Kid.
38. A meteor is the name for the astronomical bodies that
enter the earth's atmosphere.
39. Schultz is the last name of the man who created the
comic str~p "Li '1 Abner"'.
40. The name of von Frisch is usually associated with the
biological studies of bees.
41. Madison is the last name of the 4th u.s. president.
42. The drachma is the monetary unit in the country of Egypt.
43. Three fourths of the world's cacao comes from South
America.
44. Angora is the breed of cat that has blue eyes.
45. Gantry is the last name of the football player known
as "The Galloping Ghost"'.
46. Garland is the last name of the singer who made a hit
recording of the song "'Who's Sorry Now?".
47. Polo is the sport in which a rider on horseback hits a
ball with his mallet.
48. Nebula is the name of the brightest star in the sky
exclusing the sun.
49. Occur is the name of the substance derived from a
whale that is used to make perfume.
50. A balk fs the name of an illegal move by a baseball
pitcher that results in all runners advancing one base.
51. Stone is the last name of the author of "The Agony and
the Ecstasy".
52. Silver is the metal associated with a 50th wedding
anniversary.
53. Mertz was the last name of Lucy's neighbors on the
television show "I Love Lucy".
54. The Rhine is the name of the river that runs through
Rome.
55. Communism is the most famous work written by Karl
Marx.
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56. Virgil wrote the "Aeneid".
57. Venezuela is the country in which Angel Falls is
located.
58. Erhart is the last name of the first person to
complete a solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean.
59. Carnegy is the last name of the man who invented the
phonograph •
60. Bannister is the last name of the first man to run the
mile ~n under four minutes.
61. Red is the color name given to a light of 650 millimicrons.
62. Corbett is the last name of the boxer who won the
boxing title from John L. Sullivan.
63. Wings is the name of the first movie to receive the
academy award for best picture.
64. Arthur is the last name of the twenty-first u.s.
president.
65. The technical name for the collar bone is the scapular.
66. Eagle was the name of the Apollo lunar module that
landed the first man on the moon.
67. An odometer is the name of the instument used to
measure w~ndspeed.
68. Potatoes are native to Ireland.
69. Sydney is the capitol of Austraila.
70. Dickens is the last name of the author who wrote
"Oliver Twist".
71. Ford is the last name of the man who supposedly killed
Jesse James.
72. Mozart is the last name of the composer who wrote "Don
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85. Syria borders the Mediterranean sea.
86. Jason was the leader of the Argonauts.
87. The Yangtze is the longest river in Asia.
88. West is the last name of Batman's secret identity in
the Batman comics.
89. Cody was the last name of Buffalo Bill.
90. Powers is the last name of the pilot of the U-2 spy
plane shot down over Russia in 1960.
91. Pluto was the last planet to be discovered.
92. Kahlil Gibran was most inspired by the Buddhist
religion.
93. Floyd is the last name of the criminal who was known
as "Scarface".
94. Ruby is the last name of the man who assasinated
President John F. Kennedy.
95. Fleming is the last name of the author of the James
Bond novels.
96. The Dod~ers won the 1959 World Series.
97. An ohm ~s the unit of electrical power that refers to
a current of one ampere at one volt.
98. Grant is the last name of the union general who
defeated the confederate army at the Civil War battle of
Gettysburg.
99. Wells is the last name of the author of "The War of
the Worlds".
100. Yahtze is the game which uses a doubling cube.
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Answer Key to the General Information Statements {T=True,
F=False):
51. T
1. T
52. F
2. T
53. T
3. F
54. F
4. T
55.
F
5. F
56.
T
6. T
57. T
7. F
58. F
8. F
59. F
9. F
60.
T
10. T
61. T
11. F
. 62. T
12. F
63. T
13. F
64. T
14. T
65. F
15. T
66. T
16. F
67. F
17. T
68. F
18. F
69. F
19. F
70. T
20. T
71. T
21. T
72. T
22. T
73. F
23. F
F
74.
24. T
75.
F
25. T
76.
F
26. T
77.
F
27. F
78.
T
28. F
79. T
29. F
80. F
30. F
81. T
31. T
82. F
32. F
83. F
33. F
84. T
34. T
85. T
35. T
86. T
36. T
87. T
37. F
88. F
38. T
89. T
39. F
90. T
40. T
91. T
41. T
92. F
42. F
93. F
43. F
94.
F
44. F
95.
T
45. F
96. T
46. F
97. F
47. T
98. F
48. F
99. T
F
49.
100. F
T
50.
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Questions-Only Instructions
"In this study I am interested in what people "know about
what they know".

For instance, if I asked you a question

and you gave me an answer, how sure are you that your
answer is correct.

we•11 go through two examples:

gave you the statement

11

If I

The planet Mars is three light

years from the Earth •• and asked you whether it was true or
false, you might say

11

if I have to give you an answer, I 1 ll

say its true, but 1 really have no idea whether the
statement is true or false, so 1 would be taking a guess ...
However, if I gave you the statement
present mayor of Chicago ..

*

11

Mayor Byrne is the

you would probably tell me that

the statement is true, and that in fact you are absolutely
sure that your response is correct.
Mayor Byrne is the mayor of Chicago.

You are positive that
So, when responding

to statements as true or false, sometimes you have no idea
whether your response is correct or not, sometimes you may
be a little sure or fairly sure that your response is
correct, and sometimes you may be positive that you know
you have given the correct response.
I am going to give you a stack of cards and an answer
sheet.

On each card is a general information statement,

with one word, name or date underlined.

I want you to

treat each statement as though it were a fill-in-the-blank
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question, where the blanks have already been filled in.

I

want you to decide two things for each statement. First of
all, do you think the blank has been filled in correctly,
or has it been filled in incorrectly?
correct, circle true.

If you think it is

If you think it is wrong, circle

false. Secondly, and most importantly, I want you to rate
how sure you are that your decision is correct in terms of
the scale, from 0 to 5, on the answer sheet. It is not
important how many of your decisions are correct, but it is
important that you be as accurate as you can in rating
whether your decision is correct or not.

If you really

have no idea about whether or not a statement has been
filled in correctlyr you would just be taking a guess when
making your decision, so you would probably want to circle
0, which would indicate that you really have no idea
whether your true/false response is correct or not.

If you

are somewhat sure that your decision is correct, you may
want to circle a 1 or 2.

If you are fairly sure that your

decision is correct, you may want to circle a 3 or 4.

If

you have no doubt that your decision is correct, you are
sure it is correct, then you may want to circle a 5.

Only

circle a 5 when you are absolutely sure that your decision
is correct.

Make sure that you give a decision and circle

a rating for all 100 statements.

I do not expect that you

will know the information in all the statements, but about
half of the information in the statements will probably be

familiar to you.
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It is not important how many of your

responses are correct, but it is important that you be as
accurate as you can be in your ratings.

When you are done,

you can take a 5 minute break and then we will begin the
next part.
Second part
I want to give you some feedback about your ratings.

The

easiest way for me to tell how accurate you have been in
rating the correctness of your responses is to correct your
answers, and then, for each incorrect response you made,
add up the number of points that you gave that response, in
terms of how sure you were that it was correct.

If you

were very accurate in your ratings, the total rating score
for all your incorrect responses should be low, indicating
that you were not sure that these answers were correct.
Your total score was

It is ,of course, difficult to

tell what this number may mean about your performance,
since you are not able to compare it to a number indicating
average subject performance.

However, in a general way,

this number indicates that sometimes, when you thought an
answer was correct 1 and gave it a high rating, it turned
out to be incorrect.
questions again.

Please respond to and rate the

Do not worry about what your responses

were on the first trial.

Try to approach the questions as

if you were answering them for the first time.

Also, try

to be as accurate as you can in your confidence ratings for

your responses, since
your response. ''

.

th~s

(Note:

is purposely ambiguous.

.

~s

the most

.

~mportant

part of
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The feedback given to this group
The number given to them, though

an accurate measure of their total ratings for wrong
answers, has very little meaning, since they are given no
comparison values.

The explanation given of the number

they received is the important feedback.

They are told

that sometimes when they thought an answer was correct, it
was not correct.

Therefore they are given simple, brief

feedback that they have been overconfident in some of their
ratings.}
Monetary Incentive Instructions
In this study I am interested in what people "know about
what they know ...

Por instance, if I asked you a question

and you gave me an answer, how sure are you that your
answer is correct.

We'll go through two examples:

If I

gave you the statement "The planet Mars is three light
years from the Earth" and asked you whether it was true or
false, you might say "If I have to give you an answer, I'll
say its true, but I really have no idea whether the
statement is true or false,so I would be taking a guess".
However, if I gave you the statement "Mayor Byrne is the
present mayor of Chicago" you would probably tell me that
the statement is true. and that in fact you are absolutely
sure that your response is correct.
r~Iayor

You are positive that

Byrne is the mayor of Chicago. So, when responding to

statements as true or false, sometimes you have no idea
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whether your response is correct or not, sometimes you may
be a little sure or fairly sure that your response is
correct, and sometimes you may be positive that you know
you have given the correct response.
I am going to give you a stack of cards and an answer
sheet.

On each card is a general information statement,

with one word, name or date underlined.

I want you to

treat each statement as though it were a fill-in-the-blank
question, where the blanks have already been filled in.
want you to decide two things for each statement.

I

First of

all, do you think the blank has been filled in correctly,
or has it been filled in incorrectly?
correct, circle true.
false.

If you think it is

If you think it is wrong, circle

Secondly, and most importantly, I want you to rate

how sure you are that your decision is correct.

I want

you to do this in terms of the amount of money (in pennies)
that you would be willing to bet that your decision is
correct.

It is not important how many of your decisions

are correct, but it is important that you be as accurate as
you can in rating whether your decision is correct or not.
This jar contains the maximum amount of pennies that you
could win if all of your ratings, and therefore all of your
bets are accurate.

You also cannot lose more than this

amount of money, so this does not at all involve having you
use any of your own money.

Think about placing your bets

using the following procedure: imagine that the numbers
from

e
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to 5 by each of your decisions represents the number

of pennies that you want to bet that your decision is
correct. If you really have no idea about whether a
statement has been filled in correctly or not, you would
just be taking a guess when making your decisions, so you
might not want to place any money on the probability that
your decision is correct, and therefore you might want to
circle

e

pennies. If you are somewhat sure that your

decision is correct you may want to bet 1 or 2 pennies on
the correctness of your decision.

If you are fairly sure

that your decision is correct, then you may want to bet 3
or 4 cents.

If you have no doubt that your decision is

correct, you are sure it is correct, then you may want to
bet 5 cents.

Only bet 5 cents when you are absolutely sure

that your decision is correct. Make sure that you give a
decision and circle the amount of pennies you want to place
on the correctness of that decision for all

1ee

statements.

We do not expect that you will know the information in all
the statements, but about half of the information in the
statements will probably be familiar to you.

It is not

important how many of your decisions are correct, but it is
important that you be as accurate as you can be in your
ratings.

When you are done, you can take a 5 minute break

and then we will begin the next part.
Second part

I want to give you some feedback about your rating bets. 114
The easiest way for me to tell how accurate you have been
in rating the correctness of your response is to correct
your answers, and then, for each incorrect response you
made, add up the number of pennies that you bet on that
response, in terms of how sure you were that it was
correct.

That is the number of pennies that you have lost.

If you were very accurate in your bets, then the total
number of pennies that you would have bet for all your
incorrect responses should be low, indicating that you were
not sure that these answers were correct.
of pennies you have lost is

The total number

It is difficult to tell

exactly what this number means, since you don't know how
much money you have won for your bets on your correct
answers.

However, this indicates that sometimes when you

thought an answer was correct, and placed a higher number
of pennies on it. for your bet, it turned out to be
incorrect, and you lost those pennies.

Please answer and

place bets on the questions again, and try to be as
accurate as you can be with your bets.

If you are more

accurate in your rating bets this time, you can win back
some or all of the money that you lost, since I will give
you money from the trial you are most accurate on.
worry about the responses you gave last time.

Don't

Try to

approach the questions as though you are responding to them
for the first time, and remember that it is important that
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you be as acccurate as you can be with your bets.( In
actuality, due to limited funds,subjects were offered a
maximum of $2 after the entire experiment was over, no
matter how high their actual winnings were.

Approximately

1/2 of the subjects of both age groups took their winnings,
the others said they had enjoyed the study, and did not
want to take their winnings, even though money won was
offered to each of these subjects several times).
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Subject Selection
Two forms of the general information questionnaire
were originally planned to be administered to subjects; an
"easy" form and a more "difficult" form.

The difference

between the two questionnaires was that every third
question from questions 1 to 90 was an "easy" question on
form A (selected so that it was answered correctly over 75%
of the time on pilot studies) or a "difficult" question on
form B (selected so that it was answered correctly less
than 50% of the time in pilot studies).

The criterion for

deciding which form to administer to each subject was the
subject's score on the Quick Test.

As stated earlier,

subjects scoring 43 or above on the QT were given a form B,
and subjects scoring less than 43 received form A.
However, after testing many of the older subjects, it
was found that very few of the subjects who agreed to
participate received less than a score of 43.

Since it was

difficult to recruit older subjects, form A was discarded
from further analyses, and only those subjects who scored a
43 or above on the QT were included in the final analyses.
The subject groups included in the following analyses
were matched for proportion of answers correct on the
questionnaire to ensure that proportion correct would not
be a factor.

In order to match subjects as closely as

possible, 5 young subjects that otherwise met the criterion
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for being included in the study were dropped because they
could not be matched with subjects in the comparison group
{4 in the young no money condition, 1 in the money
condition).

In addition, of the 17 young subjects used in

each condition, 14 of these subjects were compared to the
14 older subjects in each condition.

The best match

comparing older subjects from Trial 1 to 2 was to drop 2
subjects each in the money and no money conditions.
Preliminary analysis of subject data before matching
is shown on calibration curves in Figures lD and 2D.

The

data pattern between these unmatched subject comparisons
and the matched comparisons shown in the results section
{Figures 1 -12) is similar, but since differences in
proportion correct are known to have some influence on
calibration {Lichtenstein, et al., 1982}, all the following
analyses are done on matched subjects.
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